Dynastic Cycle: A Resource Allocation Theme for Addressing Dissent in Universities by Zaini, Raafat et al.
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
DigitalCommons@WPI
Social Sciences and Policy Studies Faculty Working
Papers Department of Social Science and Policy Studies
6-2014
Dynastic Cycle: A Resource Allocation Theme for
Addressing Dissent in Universities
Raafat Zaini
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Khalid Saeed
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Michael Elmes
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Oleg Pavlov
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/ssps-papers
This Unpublished Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Social Science and Policy Studies at DigitalCommons@WPI.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Social Sciences and Policy Studies Faculty Working Papers by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@WPI.
Suggested Citation
Zaini, Raafat , Saeed, Khalid , Elmes, Michael , Pavlov, Oleg (2014). Dynastic Cycle: A Resource Allocation Theme for Addressing
Dissent in Universities. .
Retrieved from: http://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/ssps-papers/1
 
 
Department of Social Science and Policy Studies, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, 100 Institute Road, 
Worcester, MA  01609 | Tel: +1-508-831-5296 | Fax: +1-508-831-5896 
 
 
 
 
Department of Social Science and Policy Studies Working Papers    
No. 2014-006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dynastic Cycle: A Resource Allocation 
Theme for Addressing Dissent In 
Universities 
 
Raafat Zaini 
Khalid Saeed 
Michael Elmes 
Oleg Pavlov 
 
WPI 
 
 
 
 
#ISDC14 1/58 Zaini et al  
 
Dynastic Cycle: A Resource Allocation Theme For Addressing Dissent In 
Universities 
Raafat Zaini, Khalid Saeed, Michael Elmes, Oleg Pavlov 
Department of Social Science and Policy Studies 
Worcester Polytechnic Institute 
Worcester, MA 01609-2280 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................................ 2	  
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 3	  
Theory .............................................................................................................................................. 4	  
Dissent Expression Mechanisms in Organizations ...................................................................... 4	  
The Dynastic Cycle Structure ...................................................................................................... 8	  
Dissent expression and the Dynastic Cycle ............................................................................... 10	  
Dissent in Universities ................................................................................................................... 14	  
Faculty Governance ................................................................................................................... 15	  
Faculty and administration roles and relationships over time .................................................... 17	  
Faculty and university performance ........................................................................................... 21	  
A model for dissent in universities ................................................................................................. 25	  
#ISDC14 2/58 Zaini et al  
 
Model calibration ....................................................................................................................... 40	  
Policy experiments ..................................................................................................................... 43	  
I. Growth scenarios ................................................................................................................ 43	  
II. Changes in single organizational capabilities .................................................................... 46	  
III. Changes in multiple organizational capabilities .............................................................. 50	  
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................... 53	  
References ...................................................................................................................................... 56	  
 
Abstract 
This paper utilizes the dynastic cycle framework proposed in (K. Saeed & Pavlov, 2008) to 
explain the role of dissent in universities. By combining the dissent expression framework 
(Kassing, 2011) and the dynastic cycle structure, we construct a generic model for dissent in 
organizations. The work is rooted in the literature of organizational communication, research and 
development, and higher education management.  Using system dynamics methodology, we 
illustrate the dynamic interaction of composition, climate, and performance to simulate and 
explain how organizations evolve with regard to dissent. This model provides a platform for 
experimentation with different policy scenarios focusing on growth and productivity. The 
research suggests that as universities attempt to improve their performance through growth, 
despite initial short-term performance improvements, they are likely to devolve into low 
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performance institutions with degraded management responsiveness and organizational 
productivity. Regardless of having high dissent tolerance, they could become dominated by high 
control and silence climates. When organizations invest in cultivating a dissent aware climate, 
and strive to improve their dissent processing capability, we suggest that the university and its 
members will be more productive and engaged.  
Keywords : organizational behavior, organizational communication, voice, silence, collegial 
systems, higher education management, research and development, system dynamics, computer 
simulation, , governance. 
Introduction 
The capacity for organizational management to process and respond to dissent contributes to an 
organization’s composition, communication climate and performance. We explore this topic by 
looking into the dynamic interactions among key factors such as management capability to handle 
dissent, organizational composition, the manifestation of different dissent expression 
mechanisms, and organizational performance. We will also consider the role of dissent expression 
and processing as it affects the impact of organizational composition on communication climate 
and performance over time. Cooper and Burke (2013) have indicated that the volume of voice 
expression and perception of communication climate over time are areas worthy of research 
(Cooper & Burke, 2013). Kassing (2011)  has also suggested that the accumulation of 
unprocessed dissent in organizations is an unexplored area in the organizational communications 
field. Both topics and their relationship to the dynamic interactions within the organization will 
be investigated in this paper.   
What distinguishes this research is the use of system dynamics methodology to unravel the role of 
#ISDC14 4/58 Zaini et al  
 
accumulation processes controlled by inflows and outflows (Perlow & Repenning, 2009) 
responsible for accumulation and depletion of organizational dissent. The research contributes to 
the body of knowledge in organizational studies in general and to the dissent literature in 
particular by constructing a generic dynamic framework using both the dynastic cycle generic 
structure  (K. Saeed & Pavlov, 2008) and the dissent expression mechanisms framework 
(Kassing, 2011) to show causal relationships among dissenters and administrators and to 
understand dissent expression mechanisms and their consequences for organizational 
performance in the context of higher education. The core structure could in the future include 
other envisioned influences that might add to the richness of the issue.  
In the following sections we will introduce the literature on dissent in organizations followed by a 
brief introduction of the dynastic cycle microstructure.  We then combine these two literatures to 
present a hypothesis of organizational dissent and the dynastic cycle. We then discuss literature 
on dissent in a university context and, combining these literatures, propose a model for dissent in 
universities using the dynastic cycle structure and dissent expression framework. From there we 
present several different policy scenario experiments and discuss the implications for research 
and practice.  
Theory 
Dissent Expression Mechanisms in Organizations 
Dissent is ubiquitous in organizations (Kassing, 1997). It can take many forms include expressing 
discontent with management constraints or expectations that are not met (Kassing, 2011) or 
simply surfacing differences of opinion, perceptions, goals, and beliefs about issues in the 
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organization (Perlow & Repenning, 2009). Dissent often challenges the  status quo as well 
(Garner, 2013). It is an important factor for the growth of both the individual and organization 
and it can improve decision quality (Perlow & Repenning, 2009) and enhance innovation by 
providing the opportunity for honest and mindful consideration of  alternative viewpoints 
(Rachal, 2011). It is often times expressed by those who will either implement or be affected by 
management decisions (Garner, 2013).  Dissent in organizations is not limited to the corporate 
world but extends to government agencies, non-profit organizations, healthcare providers, 
schools, and universities (Cooper & Burke, 2013).  Lack of dissent in the organization can 
contribute to groupthink behavior (Janis, 1972) that may well lead to disasters in foreign policy 
(Bay of Pigs invasion)  or high risk technical endeavors ( Challenger space shuttle explosion in 
1986) (Elmes & Gemmill, 1990). 
Limiting dissent to conflict or adversarial actions like whistleblowing, or framing it as a source of  
organizational inefficiency (Landier, Sraer, & Thesmar, 2009) has the potential of creating a 
negative management attitude towards dissent and depriving organizations of its vital benefits.  
Dissent can occur within the or outside of the organization and can be take one of three forms: 
Upward dissent, Latent dissent, and Displaced dissent (Kassing, 2011). Upward dissent is dissent 
that a party expresses directly to management with the intention that it be viewed as constructive.  
Latent dissent is typically antagonistic in nature and is expressed to coworkers inside the 
workplace to minimize the risk of punishment or embarrassment. When people fear rejection or 
punishment for expressing dissent to management, they are likely to withhold to their ideas 
(Garner, 2013) or engage in latent dissent.  Displaced dissent such as whistleblowing (Kassing, 
2011),is expressed outside the workplace and is typical in situations where individuals expect 
retaliation from management for expressions of dissent (Kassing, 2011).   
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Empirical research data (Kassing & Kava, 2013) suggests that the presence of a dissent-friendly 
environment in the organization promotes pro-social forms of expressing upward dissent. 
However, delays in management response may lead to the repetition of dissent which may invoke 
management retaliation. If people fear retaliation and withhold concerns, management may 
assume that the status quo is acceptable; dissent under these circumstances could lead to 
management suppression Eventually, the pattern of fear of retaliation-silence-maintenance of the 
status quo can  become the norm in a culture where dissent is absent.  According to Saeed (1990) 
this pattern occurs in authoritative governments which allocate more resources for control and 
reduce peoples’ civil rights through censure; ultimately this can lead to more government control 
to silence dissent and minimize insurgency which leads to declines in economic performance 
regardless to the government’s commitment to economic growth. Unfair management treatment is 
also correlated with the threat to exit the organization (Hirschman, 1970). Both the unfair 
management treatment and response delay can lead to circumvention of the chain of command 
and the expression of  displaced dissent (Kassing & Kava, 2013).  
Organizational communication climate here reflects dissent expression, management’s  attitude 
towards dissent and also organization members’ perception of management tolerance and 
responsiveness towards dissent.  Receptiveness to dissent, in a school environment for instance, 
was reported to enhance public schools communication climate and teacher morale while creating 
opportunities for school administrators to monitor decisions, adjust strategic planning initiatives, 
and redirect ineffective practices (Burns & Wagner, 2013). 
Upward dissent could be either  dismissed, ignored , or processed (Kassing, 2011). Latent dissent, 
on the other hand, is invisible which leaves no room for managing it. Dismissal typically takes 
place when tolerance to dissent is low so the management could take in no complaints, 
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suggestions, or ideas. Ignoring dissent, however, could be either happen due to incompetency in 
processing or it could take place when the organization is overloaded by too much dissent to 
process. Processing occurs when there is action associated with dissent in the form of a follow up 
communication or tangible steps taken to resolve an issue or meet a request.  
 
Figure 1: Stock and flow diagram representing dissent expression mechanisms 
Figure 1 shows a system dynamics stock and flow representation of the dissent expression 
mechanisms described above. Upward Dissent  and Latent Dissent are depicted as a stock that is 
accumulated by the act of dissenting  and depleted over time by several outflows . Upward 
dissent grows by dissenting and depleted by three   outflows;  dismissing, ignoring, and 
processing. This representation allows for demonstrating both the accumulation and depletion of 
the dismissed dissent, ignored dissent, and processed dissent. Depletion occurs when people 
forget,  move on, or simply leave the organization.  Processed dissent is depleted by the sense of 
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entitlement once an issue is resolved or a request is fulfilled.  Since there are no mechanisms 
to deal with latent dissent, it is left to the natural decay of organizational memory.  We 
will elaborate further on theses processes and their implications later in the paper. 
Kassing (2011) suggests that organizations differ in their tolerance to dissent and the implications 
associated with that. He articulated three different states regarding dissent tolerance and the 
consequences of that. The first state is when there is high tolerance to dissent which could end up 
overloading the organization with dissent that need to be processed. The second is when there is 
low tolerance to dissent that could result in under representation of dissent, hence opportunities 
for useful feedback would be lost. In between these two states there is a moderate tolerance level 
resulting in an optimum level of dissent. The suggestion for the existence of three states raises 
several questions; are these the only states  an organization could exist in?, are they eternal or 
there is opportunities for change? . What could drive that change and how? This is where system 
dynamics modeling and simulation methodology could be utilized to further explore these 
questions.  
The Dynastic Cycle Structure 
Saeed and Pavlov (2008) proposed a metaphorical model that fits a wide range of resource 
allocation problems characterized by the competition for a limited resource. It is called the 
dynastic cycle structure where the term , dynastic cycle , which has roots in Chinese history 
implies the rise and fall of governing groups over time. The three competing populations are 
Farmers (who represent useful production in a society or a firm), Soldiers (who exercise control 
like the government or administration), and Bandits (who represent looting or forbidden 
production in a society or who sabotage the firm by exploiting its members, customers or 
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stakeholders).  delineates the generic feedback structure of the model where the (+) sign means 
that an increase in a variable leads to an increase in the linked variable and vice versa, and the (-) 
sign means that an increase in one variable leads to a decrease in the linked variable and vice 
versa. 
 
Figure 2: Generic resource  allocation microstructure source: (K. Saeed & Pavlov, 2008) 
The limited resource in the model is Land where farmers grow their produce and earn income 
according to their productivity.  Tax is collected from the farmers' disposable income to support 
soldiers. Bandit appropriations take away from the farmers’ income. Depending on the relative 
amount of income per farmer to income per bandit, either farmers move into banditry to improve 
their incomes or  bandits move into farming if income from farming is higher than banditry. 
Soldiers enforce state control; their numbers grow depending on any threats to the society but are 
limited by the amount collected in taxes and the cost of hiring soldiers.  State control serves the 
purpose of deterring farmers from becoming bandits and encouraging bandits to become farmers.  
No bandits can leave banditry to become soldiers. The model assumes that soldiers and bandits 
both come from the farmer population and vice versa.  
Saeed and Pavlov (2008) suggest two performance indices for society: freedoms and economic 
legitimacy. The relative political power of the three populations defines the level of freedom, 
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whereas the relative income of farmers and bandits defines the level of economic legitimacy. 
They represent these indices in a state space  diagram made of four quadrants ( See Figure 3 )  to 
help in classifying the state of a society and describes it evolutionary path from one state to 
another. 
 
Figure 3: State space representation for the performance indices in a political system, 
source: (Kahlid Saeed, Pavlov, Skorinko, & Smith, 2014).  
For example, a failed state is where both low economic legitimacy and freedoms exit. On the 
other hand, a people power state is where high economic legitimacy and  freedoms are observed.  
For more details, the paper  (K. Saeed & Pavlov, 2008) offers a through description of the 
relationships between each population and the factors affecting its growth and decline.  Next, 
both the dissent expression mechanisms and the dynastic microstructure will be combined in a 
dynamic hypothesis explaining their interactions.  
Dissent expression and the Dynastic Cycle 
Formulating an aggregate model for the phenomena of dissent in organizations came after 
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exploring Kassing’s (1997, 2011) framework for dissent expression in relation to Saeed  and 
Pavlov (2008) model of dynastic cycles based on Farmers, Bandits, and Soldiers (referred to as 
FBS). Our focus remains within the boundary of the organization and assumes that organizational 
members remain within the organization and can only make status changes between the those 
three populations. We draw from the dynastic cycle model to identify the main actors in the 
organization who either exercise dissent or are influenced by dissent.   
An aggregate level dynamic hypothesis for addressing dissent in organizations is shown in 
Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4: Aggregate dynamic hypothesis of dissent in organizations 
The dynamic hypothesis suggests that the composition of members in an organization is 
one of the major elements that forms its communication climate while communication 
climate influences the composition of the organization in terms of which group tends to 
be dominant ( loop 1). Organizational communication climate here is a function of how 
the organizational members express dissent, how management responds to it, and how the 
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members perceive that management responds to dissent. Performance is defined as what 
the organization accomplishes and, the model proposes, is dependent on the 
organizational composition and management’s capacity to respond to dissent with 
tangible and helpful actions. Performance in turn influences the communication climate 
as well as the composition of the organization (loop 2).   The manifestation of dissent and 
how much is actually processed influences the overall performance.  Organizational 
communication climate that represents how dissent is expressed and handled impacts 
performance positively or negatively and in return performance influences how members 
(especially management) internalize and prioritize their value system in the organization 
through periodic evaluation of the impact of their dissent tolerance policies on the 
productive output of the members (loop 3).  For example if the management did not find 
a benefit form accepting and acting on dissent, it could simply dismiss it or accept but 
ignore it. In this scenario, employee suggestions could either end in the office shredder 
bins (dismissed dissent) or remain shelved (ignored) to occupy the office shelves. This 
approach typically starts at the top management level and trickles down through the 
whole organization to shape its culture. 
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Figure 5: State space representation for the performance indices in an organization from 
the dissent perspective.  
We similarly introduce two indicators for organizational dissent and performance. They 
are perceived management responsiveness to dissent which depicts the organization’s 
tolerance for dissent and efficiency in handling it. The second is organizational 
productivity that is an indicator of the return on management processing of dissent as a 
productive output. The resulting State-Space representation is shown in the 4 quadrants 
of Figure 4. Quadrant I represents high organizational productivity and high management 
responsiveness to dissent which is the optimal state according to Kassing (2011). An 
organization in that quadrant might be described as active, healthy or innovative. 
Quadrant II (overloaded) is characterized by low productivity and high responsiveness to 
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dissent and may be paralyzed by having too much dissent that it cannot process in a 
productive manner. Quadrant III (underrepresented) represents high productivity and low 
responsiveness to dissent; this organization type is similar to an industrial age, machine-
like, organization where attention is focused on outcomes primarily with little attention to 
ideas from people not in management. Finally Quadrant IV( underrepresented) is marked 
by low output and low responsiveness to dissent which could be described as 
dysfunctional bureaucracy lacking initiatives and responsiveness to internal or external 
environments.   
In the next section, an overview from the literature for the dissent in universities will be 
introduced focusing on faculty governance, the evolution of the faculty and 
administration relationship, and the performance measures of both the faculty and the 
university and how this hypothesis could relate to a university context.  
Dissent in Universities 
Dissent is not uncommon in the western academic life. Its roots stem from faculty 
academic freedom to think, inquire, express views, and control over one’s time.  It is a 
right that faculty struggled to earn and continue to protect over the years. It is very much 
in need where academics could have very strong views that often times  contradict with 
their fellow scholars (Bok, 2013) or the predominant beliefs and norms in the society at 
large. Compromise on academic freedom turned universities to caricatures in many parts 
of the world (Rosovsky, 1990). Tenure is the mechanism that helps faculty exercise this 
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right and protects faculty from external pressures. As Henry Rosovsky, Dean of the 
faculty of Arts and Sciences at Harvard, puts it, the “two crown jewels possessed by any 
tenured professor at a top school: independence and security” (1990, p. 179) . Both tenure 
and freedom enhanced faculty independence (Hodgkinson & Meeth, 1976). Absence of 
tenure would in the long run deteriorate the quality of faculty, the foundation of 
university life (Rosovsky, 1990). 
Faculty Governance 
Faculty governance at universities is the formal mechanism through which faculty share 
in governing their academic institutions and express upward dissent. Shared governance 
is “a collaborative process that includes the input of an independent board, an 
administration that leads through delegated authority, and an engaged faculty” (Legon, 
Lombardi, & Rhoades, 2013). Good governance is a product of engaged faculty willing 
to debate, offer different ideas, or dissent; this provides checks and balances to the 
university governance system (Legon et al., 2013). Typically, faculty governance’s area 
of influence includes curriculum design, academic program creation, faculty 
appointments, and no confidence votes the (Ginsberg, 2011). In addition, faculty 
governance has a stake in decisions that affect the academic content of the curriculum as 
well as the need for facilities to deliver quality education. Faculty hold the greatest power 
in research universities where the reputation and the quality of the institution depend on 
the distinction of its professors. This authority is slightly overseen by the administration 
including the president, the provost and the deans (Bok, 2013). 
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Although some past university presidents committed to shared governance have 
complained  about the delays and lost opportunities by having to consult with faculty 
committees to reach a consensus (Bok, 2013), shared participation of the faculty and 
academic leaders in governance matters can improve university governance rather than 
impede it (REF). Shared governance can also raise morale and help mobilize support for 
the adoption and implementation of academic programs despite the additional time and 
effort taken in the debate and the deliberation processes. For example, according to Bok 
(2013) it took about 5 years of deliberation to approve the changes in Harvard’s 
undergraduate program initiated by Henry Rosovsky in 1973. However, it took only two 
years afterwards for enthusiastic faculty to generate almost 100 courses which were 
newly prepared or completely revised; enrollment increased by 50% above the required 
number for those new and revised courses. In short, the process involved the faculty 
deeply. In turn they came to feel that the new curriculum was their curriculum, which 
they had played a large part in making, rather than “the product of a small blue-ribbon 
committee to which they had dutifully given their assent” (p.68). While mistakes can 
never be eliminated, according to Bok (2013), they are less likely to occur when the 
decision makers are willing to listen to the people with interest and experience in the 
subject matter to improve the outcome. In fact, Bok (2013) suggests that disastrous 
outcomes like athletics scandals or costly failed ventures are often the result of unilateral 
decisions by university administrators without faculty input.  Rosovsky (1990) notes that 
shared governance is a major factor in explaining the high quality of the American 
university as it permits leadership to be effective by making the implementation of new 
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ideas possible (Rosovsky, 1990). 
It might be necessary to look into how governance and the exercise of academic freedom 
and their implications on the relationship with the university administration has evolved 
over time.  
Faculty and administration roles and relationships over time 
By training, professors, like to advocate their ideas vocally and passionately which 
sometimes can lead to heated conflict or confrontation (Rosovsky, 1990). Despite the 
tension-by-design between faculty and administration and the continued questioning by 
the faculty for the need for the administration function altogether, it is not uncommon to 
have world renowned tenured professors occupying top administrative positions in their 
respective institutions. The two famed physicists, Robert Oppenheimer and Oswald 
Veblen, are two examples of many research scientists who have led prominent research 
institutions like the Institute of Advanced Study (Jain, Triandis, & Weick, 2010).  Some 
worked hard to preserve freedom on campus, as in the case of Harvard university 
president Derek Bok, who did not succumb to pressure to impose a code of speech tighter 
than the first amendment as had been done at other universities (Christensen & Eyring, 
2011).  
With changes in the economic landscape and the decline of public funding for 
universities and university education, there have been calls to replace shared systems of 
governance of university administration with stronger, more corporatized administrative 
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systems that purportedly make the university more manageable and controlled (Mills, 
2012).  Contrary to the view that universities cannot be run by cost accountants or as 
commercial enterprises responding only to changing markets (Rosovsky, 1990), the 
growing emphasis on the growth and marketization of universities has lead some Boards 
of Trustees to search for and appoint university presidents from the business world with 
great fund raising capabilities but little or no prior academic background (Bok, 2013).  
Professional managers who value efficiency, hierarchy, and high and immediate returns 
on investments (Mills, 2012) often are not interested in engaging collaboratively with 
faculty. Instead, many are inclined to make unilateral decisions without faculty 
involvement resulting in their failure to gain the faculty trust (Bok, 2013).  Faced with 
tough competition and difficult economic times, many professional managers at 
universities want to grow revenues and cut costs in order to reach financial equilibrium 
(Cosenz & Bianchi, 2013). With more focus on growth , financial health, and rankings,  
emphasis has increasingly emphasized tangible objectives and performance measures  
like fund raising and the ability to attract more research grants compared to the more 
subtle and harder to measure indicators like education quality or the research 
environment. This trend has been reinforced by an increasing emphasis on ranking and 
accreditation whose link to the quality of education remains unclear. Such measures, 
however, have increasingly obsessed administrators whose performance can be be judged 
by them. Sometimes administrators behave unethically in order to be judged positively 
(Bok, 2013); for example, in a recent scandal, a faculty member at Kansas university 
discovered that a high ranking administrator had tampered with the GPA’s and test scores 
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of incoming students in order to improve the college ranking (Shumski, 2014).   
Administrators started shaping their universities to be similar to their business 
organizations. Tasks were divided and assigned to different people to help them focus 
and be more efficient at tackling the issues at hand. This has lead to the creation of new 
administrative positions with different levels of power and authority. Initially, some 
administrative positions were filled by faculty but slowly drifted towards more full time 
administrators as faculty have the tendency to avoid too much administrative work, 
which started to escalate, and would rather retreat to their academic havens doing what 
they love to do; teaching, advising, and conducting research. Hierarchy grew and grew 
with it the number of administrative staff and the organizations got more complex with 
many levels of hierarchy and reporting relationships. More and more tenure faculty 
remain in their academic sphere and more and more of their part time administrative 
duties were shifted to the professional managers(Ginsberg, 2011). A recent study found 
that administrative growth in New England colleges reached a maximum of 900% 
whereas top universities like Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Harvard 
either put tough controls to curtail that growth (Marcus, 2013).  
Cost cutting measure were enforced by filling more faculty positions by non tenure track 
faculty mainly comprised of part time or full time teaching faculty hired with annual 
contracts or an on-demand basis. Full-time tenure-track faculty in 2012 constitute no 
more than 30% of the faculty compared to 67% in the 1970’s (Mills, 2012). Non-tenure-
track faculty typically receive neither the same compensation or benefits and often do not 
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voice their views compared to their tenured or tenure-track counterparts. They may not 
have the same personal stake in the institution or concern for shaping its educational 
program or policies since they may be teaching at other institutions or busy doing day 
jobs.  Many critics fear that the shift to greater reliance on non-tenure-track faculty will 
degrade academic values and shared governance that could potentially impede the values 
and functions of the university (Bok, 2013). 
More recently critics have raised the questions about the role of administrative policy 
with regard to freedom of expression on university campuses. For example, the 
University of Kansas’ new social media policy gives the administration the power to fire 
faculty or staff who improperly use social media in a way that is contrary to the best 
interests of the university. The change in policy was triggered by a faculty member’s 
anti-National Rifle Association tweet that invited other faculty to call for a repeal of the 
policy. Rothschild (2013) framed this as an example of how universities might try to 
stifle the faculty’s freedom of speech in response to the pressures of donors, corporate 
partners, political entities, or external performance measures leading. This process could 
lead to an erosion of  academic and governance values over time (Bok, 2013; Rothschild, 
2013).  
Faculty governance has also had its share of issues with regard to dissent expression. 
Over the years faculty governance has developed its own hierarchy that, especially at the 
top, has become more aligned with administration policy and reduced governance 
participation by limiting the inclusion of faculty with dissenting voices (Hodgkinson & 
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Meeth, 1976) and listening to more moderate and politically-correct voices. To some 
extent, it became the formal channel for communication through layers of committees 
dealing, most of the time, with trivial issues and giving less attention to issues related to 
the direction of the institution. Hence, respected faculty with bold views and deep 
concern about important issues became less interested to join. This view was 
corroborated in a recent survey of the rank-and-file professors that found that the faculty 
have limited influence in campus issues which reflects either communication issues or 
lack of interest (Bok, 2013).  In both cases, this could be interpreted as a decline of 
upward dissent – which means less dissent reaches the administration to influence their 
decisions  and a rise of latent dissent, that is, more dissent is hidden and not accounted 
for. 
We are proposing that the combination of an authoritarian administration, a dysfunctional 
faculty governance system, and silent faculty is likely to lead to declines in performance 
for the university. To understand this, in the next section we consider how performance is 
defined and measured in a university context.  
Faculty and university performance 
Performance measurement is an integral part of a wider strategic management activity 
aimed at achieving a sustainable development of the academic institution (Cosenz & 
Bianchi, 2013). University faculty teach, conduct research, publish papers, advise 
students, write research grants and student recommendations, serve on university 
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committees host visitors, and respond to inquiries (Jain et al., 2010). As cosmopolitans 
(Gouldner, 1957, 1958), academic activities extend beyond the boundaries of their local 
organizations to reach their academic community through participation in conferences 
and colloquia, journal editorial boards, and leadership positions in their respective field’s 
societies. To assess the performance of faculty and their institutions, both the quantity 
and quality of their output can be used to determine their effectiveness. Quantity of work 
often refers to the number of reports, publications, grants, and new products while quality 
of the work often refers to the quality of journals that faculty publish in, the number of 
patents obtained, the amount of research funding, and the number of citations to faculty 
publications. Feeling the pride by being a part of the institution is another intangible 
measure. Direct profits or return on investment from implementation of research products 
are other factors too (Jain et al., 2010).  
It is perhaps also necessary to review few organizational output measures  for research 
and development organizations with which universities share many attributes.  These 
measures are eloquently presented by Jain et al. (2010). Output measures could be 
associated with (1) process measures, (2) results measures, or (3) strategic indicators. 
Results measures are related to the activities carried out by the institution like the type of 
assistance provided to other department or to outside organizations, or the number of 
responses to enquires from external scientific or internal departments. It also could 
include the number of visitors to the institution and the number of administrative types of 
actions handled. Results measures refers to tangible, measurable outputs expressed in 
terms of the organization goals and objectives which would include number of published 
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technical reports, published refereed papers, generated patents, developed and 
commercialized innovations, and obtained external grants. Strategic indicators are related 
to the long term performance and would include the reputation, ability to attract to quality 
faculty, students, funding, and the job satisfaction of all the members.    
The criteria for university output measures seem to be influenced by external entities 
such as national and international university ranking publications, accreditation boards, 
and government agencies or ministries (Cosenz & Bianchi, 2013)  which tend to give 
more focus on short term results measures rather than process or strategic long term 
indicators.  Such foci would define organizational productivity as the ratio of achieved 
output to input (Jain et al., 2010) over a short period of time where inputs can be 
determined by the allocated or consumed resources (Cosenz & Bianchi, 2013) which, for 
the purposes of this paper, includes the effort invested in processing dissent. Failure to 
reach a high ratio of output to input could influence the operating policies of the 
organization which in the long term could influence its communication climate by 
becoming less tolerant to dissent as described earlier in the hypothesis.  
Typically faculty are evaluated in four areas: teaching, research, impact ,and service. 
Teaching includes students’ evaluations, syllabi, and written textbooks. Research would 
cover current problems, the progress, and finished or in progress papers. Impact may be 
based on reviewers’ comments, citations of publications, and invitations to give invited 
lectures at universities or conferences. Service includes membership on journal editorial 
boards, national or international committees, and university committees.  It is also 
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important to realize those faculty members have goals that go beyond the boundaries of 
the institution extending to their academic community at large. They tend to measure 
their performance against the professional standards of their scientific community. 
Accordingly, it becomes difficult to evaluate their performance based on solely internal 
standards (Jain et al., 2010). 
In principle faculty members are free to utilize their time as guaranteed by the values of 
academic freedom. The focus of their research inquiry is supposed to be driven by 
curiosity not just be mere economic value. This is not necessarily the case nowadays. 
Caltech is an illustrative example of one of the few universities resisting pressure from 
funders to place more emphasis on the application of research for tangible economic 
impact, at the expense of fundamental, curiosity-driven exploration (Baty, 2014).   
With many universities designing clear-cut, results-focused, performance measures for 
faculty performance that stem from criteria set for the institution performance, faculty 
and administrators may have different perceptions of what performance means and this 
can be a source of significant tension. Nonetheless, distinguished universities like Caltech 
have not succumbed to such measures like the  number of published papers or the 
numbers in citation indices to look for what is new and different. Paying less attention to 
external judgment takes a certain level of self confidence (Baty, 2014). 
As shown before, output can also be subjective or objective, qualitative or quantitative 
and can include a measure for quality. In R&D organizations and universities in 
particular, due to their multiple objectives, their outputs are typically subjective and 
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qualitative where the units of measure resist accurate comparison between different 
outputs. Therefore, combining a suite of multidimensional indicators into an aggregate 
might create general trends and patterns for both the individual and organizational output 
measures (Jain et al., 2010). Therefore, we will adopt an aggregate  measure for faculty 
productivity as measured by the administration who have direct influence of the 
organizational policies.  
In the next section, we will unfold the model structure that combines the dynastic cycle 
and dissent expression framework in the university context, explain the causal 
relationships, show the driving factors and their mathematical formulations, and select 
the organizational performance indicators that would help us draw some insights from the 
modeling effort.  
A model for dissent in universities  
The stock and flow representation of dissent expression mechanisms shown in Figure 1 
indicates the need for organizational members to express and manage dissent. With the 
clear distinction between the administrative and academic roles, and the pressure to 
establish tangible, short-term results based on performance measures for both faculty and 
university performance as described earlier, the structure for Farmers, Bandits, Soldiers 
(See Figure 6) becomes relevant for representing the organizational composition of a 
generic academic institution. To do so, we have used a new terminology below and 
shown how they are connected. Admins represent administrators, and Upward Dissenters 
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(UD) or Latent Dissenters (LD) represent the faculty . Upward dissenters can become 
latent dissenters and vice versa. At the same time, upward dissenters can also become 
administrators and vice versa. The flow between these different states and the impact of 
the composition on dissent expression and performance will follow. 
Figure 6: Organizational composition representation analogous to the dynastic cycle 
structure 
As mentioned earlier, the focus of our model remains within the boundaries of the 
organization; thus, we assume that organizational members remain within the 
organization and can only make status changes. The possibility of exiting the 
organization is not modeled here as it calls for adding displaced dissent or 
whistleblowing which raises questions like loyalty (Hirschman, 1970) and adds greater 
complexity to the model than we would like for this paper.  Another point to clarify here 
is how our organizational composition framework differs from the cosmopolitans and 
locals (Gouldner, 1957, 1958) view of the organizational members where faculty are not 
expected to be engaged in local issues within the university and only those who are 
dependent on the institution for meaning and security are expected to be engaged in its 
internal affairs. We also depart from the clear-cut classification of faculty to tenure-track, 
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non-tenure, or adjunct faculty that is mostly known in the United States higher education 
system.  Hence, Upward dissenters and Latent Dissenters categories here do not pertain 
to one type of faculty versus another.  For example, tenured or tenure-tenure track faculty 
are expected to be in the upward dissenters group , however, when  disgruntled they 
could move to the latent dissenters group. The same goes for non-tenure track and 
adjuncts. They are initially expected to be in the latent dissenters category but they can 
move to the upward dissenters category when encouraged or when their fear of losing 
their jobs are mitigated.  
Figure 7: Combining the dissent expression mechanisms and the organizational composition 
and the associated feedback structure 
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Figure 7 shows the combination of dissent expression mechanisms and the organizational 
composition. The feedback structure indicates the causal link between Upward Dissenters 
and Upward Dissent and the same goes for Latent Dissenters and Latent Dissent.  The 
flow between the two stocks of Upward Dissenters and Latent Dissenters is influenced by 
the feedback coming from the dissent expression structure. In this model there are two 
major factors that control organizational composition and in particular the flow of latent 
dissenters to becoming upward dissenters and vice versa. They are the perceived 
management tolerance to dissent and the perceived management responsiveness shown in 
Figure 7. High management tolerance and responsiveness encourage latent dissenters to 
voice their concerns and low management tolerance and responsiveness to dissent fosters 
fear or cynicism to encourages people to express dissent laterally. To define them, we 
need to elaborate more on the dissent expression structure introduced earlier in the paper.  
As can be seen in Figure 7, upward dissent is expressed in vocally to the management by 
upward dissenters and latent dissent is expressed laterally by latent dissenters. 
Management’s response to upward dissent expression may include processing it 
effectively by, for instance,  engaging in dialogue or  revising policies and procedures; 
we refer to this as processed dissent. Management could also consider dissent as a low 
priority issue and ignore it resulting in a stock of ignored dissent. They could also dismiss 
dissent entirely creating a stock of dismissed dissent. Sometimes it is the content of 
dissent that is dismissed; other times it is the people who are dismissed as when an 
administrator might reply to the suggestion of a faculty member, “Who are you any way? 
“ (Örtenblad & Koris, 2014).  
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Some organizations have long memories especially when turnover is low (Perlow & 
Repenning, 2009) as is true for tenured faculty in universities. Many long term 
organizational members, perhaps including some members of the administration, would 
keep track of all the dissent in the organization be it upward, dismissed, ignored, or even 
the latent dissent leading to what Perlow and Repenning (2009) call high “issue 
permanence” that increases dysfunctional silence. Perceived management tolerance for 
dissent is quantified as the ratio of upward dissent to the ignored, dismissed, and latent 
dissent.  
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑  𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒  𝑡𝑜  𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 = !"#$%&  !"##$%&!"#$"##%&  !"##$%&!!"#$%&'  !"##$%!!!"#$%#  !"##$%&  
Low perceived management tolerance suggests greater levels of ignored, dismissed, and 
latent dissent and drives upward dissenters to become latent dissenters as shown in Figure 
7. Management’s perception of its tolerance for dissent considers only what they received 
and dismissed, not what they ignored or what was processed covertly. Thus, 
administrators often underestimates how much dissent they actually perceive. 
The second factor in the model is the perceived management responsiveness to dissent, 
which comes from comparing processed dissent to upward, dismissed, ignored, and latent 
dissent.  The perception of management’s responsiveness could used be as an indicator of 
the organizational performance with respect to dissent acceptance and processing given 
in the equation below: 
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𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑  𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠
=    𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑  𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑈𝑝𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑  𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝐼𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑  𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 
Higher levels of processed dissent when compared to the total dissent perceived by the 
employees improves perceived management responsiveness. However, processed dissent 
stock decays over time since it is considered as a sort of entitlement. For example when 
the faculty advocate for a better healthcare plan and the administration approves it, it is 
considered as a processed dissent; over time, however, it can be seen as an earned right 
that is rarely recognized by the new faculty as a product of management’s responsiveness 
to dissent.  Part of the challenge for improving perceived management’s responsiveness 
to dissent is that processing dissent takes time, patience, and recourses (Kassing, 1997) 
and not every organization is able or willing to make those investments. Few 
organizations recognize the impact of responsiveness to dissent on their organizations by 
replying to any sort of voice action in a maximum of 10 days (Ferguson & Sypher, 1998, 
p. 259). 
Perceived management responsiveness, therefore, indicates whether the organization is 
serious about both accepting and processing dissent by responding and acting in a timely 
manner. For example, the presence of open communication channels that encourages 
upward dissent,  perceived management tolerance for dissent would improve. However, 
if  major decisions concerning the faculty well being or the direction of the institution 
continue to be made without their consultation or if their concerns were not respectfully 
addressed, this will impact the perceived management responsiveness to dissent 
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negatively. Accordingly, some faculty will remain quiet and more  faculty might 
disengage and join the latent dissenters leaving the floor for administrators to act 
unilaterally.  This could weaken the commitment and productivity of the faculty as they 
might engage in cynical peer to peer dialogue or direct their energies towards job hunting 
or resisting other administrative policies.  This would ultimately impact both the short 
term and long term performance of the institution.  
Management are likely to assess the situation differently, however, because they judge 
their responsiveness by how much dissent they processed with respect to how much 
dissent they received only. Thus they are blind to dissent that is expressed but which they 
do not perceive. It is interesting to know that a recent survey that Bok (2013) reported 
found that 97% of administrators characterized their relationship with the faculty as 
“cooperative” and “mostly collegial” while the remaining 3% thought it is “suspicious 
and adversarial” (p.75). On the other hand, only 47% of faculty representatives thought 
the relationship was collegial and the remaining thought it is either “suspicious and 
adversarial” or “conflictual but mostly collegial”. The difference between the views of 
administrators and faculty was explained by the fact that as universities grew and so does 
the number of faculty with a shrinking percentage  of faculty being involved in 
governance. Another explanation might be due to the difference in perception of 
management responsiveness to dissent as viewed by the administrators and by the 
faculty.  
It is also important to consider how the composition of organizational members 
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influences the change of status between the composition groups which ultimately 
influences  the communication climate of the organization which reflects back on the 
composition as shown by loop 1 in Figure 4. We suggest three influence parameters; the 
upward dissenters influence  defined as the ratio of upward dissenters to the admins and 
latent dissenters, the admin influence defined as the ratio of admins to the upward and the 
latent dissenters, and lastly, the latent dissenters influence  defined as the ratio of the 
latent dissenters to the admins and the upward dissenters.  These constructs are consistent 
with the thinking of Saeed (2008) and Pavlov in representing freedoms, threat to society, 
and state control. Influence on the flows between the different population categories by 
their mere ratios is shown in Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8: Organizational composition indicators and their influence on organizational 
composition  
Administrative influence through division of tasks, and the exercise of control could, to 
some degree, help administrators devise better ways to meet with, listen to and attend to 
the concerns of faculty as they are encouraged to speak up and participate (Jain et al., 
2010) (latent dissenters become upward dissenters, Figure 8 ) to improve decision quality 
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(Bok, 2013) and organizational performance. Over time greater administrative attention 
to faculty might also lead to a decline in latent dissenters influence and a growth in 
upward dissenters influence, which reduces the need for more administrative roles and 
help admin allocate time for academic activities (net flow goes from admins to upward 
dissenters) thus contributing to greater productivity. This view is corroborated by an 
empirical study for 1300 scientists in different research organizations including 7 major 
university departments, where it was found that the most effective scientists are those 
who pursued their own ideas, valued their freedom, and influenced decision makers (Jain 
et al., 2010).  
Administrators can pursue a host of formal or informal dissent encouragement ideas 
(Kassing, 2011) to help latent dissenters become upward dissenters. They can directly 
consult with their organizational members (Uhl-Bien, Riggio, Lowe, & Carsten, 2014) or 
create opportunities for dialogue such as town hall meetings, roundtable discussions, or 
focus groups that solicit feedback about different topics (Burns & Wagner, 2013). The 
efficacy of such programs depends highly on the administration’s commitment to protect 
the safety and confidentiality of the employees (Kassing, 2011) and to devote the 
necessary time and resources to make them successful. Other ethical approaches to 
encourage upward dissent and dialogue include, for example,  moderated and non-
moderated online discussion forums that allow faculty to raise and talk about sensitive 
issues. This approach falters, however, if they are perceived as censored platforms even if 
the moderation is intended to avoid hate speech or the eruption of uncontrolled conflict 
(Postma & Blignaut, 2013).  Whatever method is chosen, it will take time and effort from 
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those who are responsible for developing, implementing, operating, and maintaining the 
necessary information technology systems for them to be effective. At the same time, 
administrative influence would have a negative impact on the processing of dissent. It 
may introduce many delays in processing, as the issue has to go through much red tape 
for checking and approval which could ultimately reduces the perceived management 
responsiveness and hence increase latent dissenters ( See Figure 9). 
The remaining part in this model is performance. In a university context, faculty 
members are the productive work force fulfilling its mission of “education and research”. 
Through multitude of engagements with others in the university, they are expected to 
voice their opinions either formally (e.g., to faculty governance committees) or 
informally (e.g., through everyday conversations with department heads, deans, and other 
administrators in the echelon). Their influence in the organization tends to enhance 
productivity (Kassing, 2011) and becomes the norm for behavior. When the 
communication climate is associated with collegiality through shared governance, for 
example, it does not require additional administration ( See Figure 9). Non-tenure track 
faculty, on the other hand,  are expected to focus on doing their jobs which involve 
teaching and advising mostly. Because they cannot express dissent openly however, they 
might choose to exercise latent dissent and voice their discontent to their peers, which 
may or may not reach administrators for processing. This would lead to a rise in stock of 
latent dissent influence. This in turn contribute negatively to productivity (See Figure 9) 
through distractions and waste of time (Senor & Singer, 2011). 
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Administrators actively monitor the performance of the institution through many 
dashboard indicators and actively controlling resources to meet the institution’s goals. 
While attempting to improve their institution’s performance through growth or 
compliance to external demands, many activities are likely to be generated that requires 
more administrators and the relative rise of administrative influence. For example, the 
quest for obtaining accreditation for programs has lead to the need for more time and 
effort devoted to compliance to the requirements of the accreditation boards. This can 
occupy faculty time with more administrative tasks and distract them from performing 
their main function of teaching and research ( see reduction in productivity, Figure 9) ,  or  
offering the faculty more supervisory roles leading to more hierarchical layers ( UD 
become admins flow in Figure 9).  Another approach to the problem, which is not 
modeled here, is to hire more professional administrators from the business world. 
Administrative growth could lead to a rise in the administrative influence and the 
organizational complexity which, in turn, overburdens the organization with  more 
administrative tasks (Baty, 2014). 
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Figure 9:  Organizational composition influence on dissent expression and  performance 
which in turn influences dissent expression. 
To elaborate further, imagine the development of detailed performance measures as 
#ISDC14 37/58 Zaini et al  
 
defined by best practice standards implemented by the administrators for faculty 
performance and the organizational performance as a whole. These would call for more 
stringent control that would need to be administered by departments heads and deans. As 
the load on department heads and deans increased, more assistant administrative positions 
might be created through the initiation of academic leadership programs that would cut 
from the faculty teaching and research time by as much as 25%1.  
The advantage of such initiatives, though, is creating leadership from within. On the other 
hands, it shows where the institution focus is as a result of the growth attitude.  On the 
ground, this is a decline in upward dissenters influence because it was found that people 
who go into higher positions of power are less inclined to dissent (Cooper & Burke, 
2013) and become more aligned to the administration views (Hodgkinson & Meeth, 
1976).  It is worth noting that world renowned research universities like Caltech have 
been successful for many years by remaining small; they have flat and flexible 
management systems which have enabled the administration to respond quickly to 
innovative initiatives from faculty (Baty, 2014). For many of these schools, this structure 
is a competitive advantage in that their small size reduces internal complexity and 
minimizes administrative growth and bureaucracy. At Caltech administrators remain 
active researchers to maintain their status relative to their peers and faculty and to keep 
them from getting loaded with administrative tasks that might divert their attention from 
                                                1	  	  Academic	  leadership	  programs	  in	  some	  universities	  	  provide	  a	  mechanism	  for	  members	  of	  the	  faculty	  to	  serve	  in	  supportive	  roles	  to	  the	  deans	  as	  assistant	  or	  associate	  deans	  on	  a	  part	  time	  basis.	  Academic	  year	  appointments	  	  may	  require	  up	  to	  25%	  time	  commitment,	  and	  are	  renewable	  based	  on	  need	  and	  performance.	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their primary mission of promoting outstanding education and research.  
To close the loop, we need to look at how organizational productivity, as defined  earlier, 
impacts policies regarding tolerance to dissent.  Figure 10 shows a top-level 
representation of the model showing its key stocks, flows, and the feedback loops 
indicating the dynamic interaction between the organizational composition, 
communication climate, and performance. Since most of the major feedback loops go 
through multiple stocks and end up influencing different parameters, it is rather difficult 
to label and describe all the active loops but they will be introduced as needed during the 
simulation experiments.  
 Since performance is a priority, management carefully assesses the efficacy of the 
dissent tolerant policy. Administrators would likely view their processing of dissent as an 
input that needs to bring higher output to justify the tolerance and the resources invested 
in processing dissent. Accordingly, organizational productivity would be defined as the 
ratio of producing desired outcomes to processing dissent. Hence, when producing 
outcomes, for instance, the number of papers per faculty per year (Cosenz & Bianchi, 
2013), goes lower than processing of dissent, this would indicate a failure of the dissent 
tolerance policy leading to a reduced tolerance and higher dismissing rates which leads to 
less voice and more silence and control. It is known from the literature that when the 
organization is more focused on short term performance it will be more prone to 
developing intolerance to dissent that reinforces silence norms that are difficult to change 
in the future (Perlow & Repenning, 2009).  
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Figure 10:  An aggregate level model showing keys stocks and flows and  feedback loops 
between the organizational composition, communication climate, and performance  
What happens when there is too much upward dissent? If it exceeds the dissent expected 
by the organization, processing capacity drops leading to higher rate of ignoring dissent 
and a lower rate of processing dissent (loop B11 in Figure 10).   
The issue in all the above accumulation and depletion processes in the key stocks is that 
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they take time to occur. Some happen at higher rates than others. For instance, dissenting 
and its dismissal may happen quickly but processing dissent takes longer and often 
requires patience from both the faculty and the administrators. The change in perception 
of management’s tolerance for dissent may happen more quickly than changes to the 
perceived management responsiveness since it involves dissent processing. The 
difference could contribute to oscillations in organizational composition, climate, and 
performance over time. These oscillations could be exacerbated when there is a close 
monitoring of performance driven by short-term focus and fast action in changing 
management’s polices towards dissent.  What this study offers is the ability to observe 
how organizational communication climate and performance change over time moving 
from more favorable to less favorable states or vice versa. We see this demonstrated in 
policy experiments in the next section.  
The complete model with its equations is provided as an appendix in an attached file. 
Model calibration 
Our generic model pertains to theory development. Accordingly, it does not represent a 
particular case in a particular academic institution. It does suggest certain outcomes under 
particular conditions that could take place at different higher education institutions. We 
present a number of these scenarios in this section.  
The model is initialized in hypothetical equilibrium to provide a reference point from 
which to begin exploring different what-if scenarios. Figure 11 shows the two 
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organizational performance indicators in equilibrium represented as a dot in the cross 
section of the four quadrants in the state space representation diagram.  
 
Figure 11: Phase plot showing the two indicators (perceived management responsiveness) 
and (organizational productivity)  in equilibrium at the cross section of the four quadrants. 
Figure 12 shows the major stocks in the model representing the organizational 
composition, organizational communication climate, and composition influence 
indicators in  equilibrium.  
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( C ) 
Figure 12: (a)Organizational composition, dissent, and composition influence indicators in 
equilibrium 
Equilibrium values are provided in Table 1 
Table 1: Equilibrium values 
Parameters and variables Values 
Upward dissenters 10 
Latent dissenters 5 
Administrators 5 
Upward dissenter productivity 0.05 
Tolerance to dissent 0.25 
Processing of dissent 0.5 
Fraction ignored 0.25 
Upward dissent 1 
Ignored dissent 1 
Dismissed dissent 1 
Processed dissent 1 
Latent dissent 1 
Dissent per dissenter 0.1 
 
The two indices of organizational performance (organizational productivity and 
perceived management responsiveness) in a state space representation  introduced earlier 
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will be used to assess the effectiveness of intervention policies in the next section with 
references to time series plots.  
Policy experiments 
Disturbing the model from equilibrium to simulate the resulting dynamics can be 
accomplished either by population growth scenarios, changing single organizational 
capabilities related to dissent handling policies and productivities, or a combination of 
different interventions seeking the improvement of both performance indicators. The 
growth simulations are primarily intended for understanding the internal dynamics of the 
combined resource allocation system with the dissent expression framework, the latter 
providing insights into the key interventions for change. 
I.	  Growth	  scenarios	  
Three growth scenarios will be explored. An infusion with administrators resembles an 
effort by the organization to put more order and efficiency through proper distribution 
and supervision of tasks to improve performance. An infusion with upward dissenters 
resembles  growth in the institution’s productive force (the tenured faculty) with long 
term commitment. An infusion of latent dissenters takes place when the university hires 
more non-tenure track or temporary faculty with no voice or voting rights and with fewer 
privileges than tenured and tenure-track faculty. The initial growth in each group equals 
20% of its initial units. The phase plot of the performance indicators and behavior over 
time graphs simulating the infusion of each populations is shown in Figure 13 below. 
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 Figure 13: Growth scenarios simulation results showing the state space plot of each policy 
and the corresponding time series graphs for the composition influence indicators on the 
side  
Adding administrators, upward dissenters, or latent dissenters results in a final 
equilibrium at lower organizational productivity and perceived management 
responsiveness despite an initial improvement in organizational productivity.  For 
example when administrators are added their influence grows leading to fewer latent 
dissenters and an increase in upward dissenters. Latent dissent influence can be reduced 
by having more latent dissenters become upward dissenters leading to an improvement in 
upward dissenters influence and a reduction in administration growth rate and their 
influence (loop B3) which improves the productive output and organizational 
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productivity. However, more upward dissenters increases the amount of upward dissent 
which accumulates because of a drop in dissent processing as the organization reaches its 
capacity to handle dissent (loop B11) leading to higher dismissal and ignoring rates, and 
less processing of dissent influenced also by the initial increase in admin influence. This 
will reduce both the perceived management tolerance (loops B5,6,8) and perceived 
management responsiveness (loop B4,7 and R3) leading to an increase in latent dissenters 
and a decrease in upward dissenters. The increase in latent dissenters will lead to an 
increase in their influence compared to the upward dissenters influence that fosters the 
growth of administrators and their influence.  This, in turn, reduces the influence of both 
the upward and latent dissenters (loop B2). The fluctuation in the influence of each group 
affects Upward Dissenters productivity both positively and negatively.   
Another contributor to reaching this state is the increase in latent dissenters and latent 
dissent that will also reduce both the perceived management tolerance (loop B9) and 
responsiveness (loop B10) which both increase the latent dissenters influence ,causing a 
drop in productivity, that leads to calls for greater administrative influence. When 
organizational productivity drops as a result of a higher admin influence and latent 
dissenters influence , tolerance for dissent declines leading to a higher dissent dismissal 
rate. This then decreases the accumulation of upward dissent but increases dismissed 
dissent which, together, reduces both the perceived management tolerance for dissent and 
perceived management responsiveness, which, in turn, increases latent dissenters and 
calls for more administrators (loop R12). The cyclic behavior continues until it 
equilibrates at a composition comprised of high admin influence followed by latent  and 
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upward dissenters influence  ( see time series charts in Figure 13) leading to an 
organizational state in quadrant IV at low levels of organizational productivity and 
perceived management responsiveness.  The remaining two scenarios reach the same 
result as the organization will always hit its capacity to handle dissent and get trapped in 
an efficiency mode trying to control every aspect of its environment.  
The summary of the growth policies and their equilibrium quadrant in the phase plot is 
given in Table 2 below. 
Table 2:  Simulations summary of population growth scenarios. 
Simulation 
(figure) 
Policy instrument 
( curve) 
Change 
(value) 
Organizational 
productivity 
(quadrant) 
Perceived 
management 
responsiveness 
( quadrant) 
Growth of 
population by 
external 
infusion 
(Figure 13) 
Administrators population           
(curve 1) 
+20% (1) IV IV 
Upward Dissenters  (UD) 
population (curve 2) 
+20% (2) IV IV 
Latent Dissenters (LD) 
population (curve 3) 
+20% (1) IV IV 
 
II.	  Changes	  in	  single	  organizational	  capabilities	  	  
Another set of simulations comprises changes to a number of organizational capabilities 
intended to improve the two performance indicators. They include changing the 
organization’s tolerance for dissent either by becoming a more dissent-accepting  
organization or less dissent-accepting organization. Along this line, the organization 
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might have a high or low volume of dissent issues raised by its members. A high dissent 
volume might reflect a tendency for personally-centered dissent while a lower dissent 
volume might reflect a more principled type focused on important issues (Kassing, 2011).  
Among other capability improvements, the institution might also try to improve the 
productivity of its members by concentrating on training to improve their teaching and 
research related skills (Cosenz & Bianchi, 2013). The institution could also try to become 
more efficient at processing of dissent hence reducing red tape that might cause 
unnecessary time delays in acting on dissent.  
This type of policies is implemented by changing the relevant  model parameters by a 
certain percentage which we select here to be ±  20% . The simulations for the above 
parameters are shown in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14: Changes in single capabilities simulation results showing the phase plot of each 
policy and the corresponding time series for the composition influence indicators on  the 
side  
All 6 polices lead to similar final states in quadrant IV (low organizational productivity 
and perceived management responsiveness) despite their different paths towards reaching 
that final quadrant. Only the Upward Dissenters (UD) productivity improvement policy 
(curve 3) showed a different outcome by finishing in quadrant 3 (improved 
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organizational productivity and low perceived management responsiveness). Initially the 
UD productivity improvement policy showed an increase in productivity while the 
responsiveness remained unchanged. This improvement in organizational productivity 
makes the organization more tolerant to dissent and hence improves the communication 
climate in general and the upward dissenters influence in particular (Loop R6). However, 
as more upward dissenters express their dissent, processing it hits a limit leading to a 
decline in both the organizational productivity and responsiveness to dissent  and the 
communication climate suffers (Loop B5).  As can also be seen from the time series 
charts in Figure 14, administrative influence dominates the equilibrium state except for 
the productivity improvement policy where the upward dissenters influence is at a 
slightly higher level than both the latent dissenters and administrative influence. This 
may explain the relative improvement in organizational productivity. A summary of the 
results is given in Table 3. 
Table 3:  Simulations summary of single capabilities changes. 
Simulation 
(figure) 
Policy instrument 
(curve) 
Change 
(value) 
Organizational 
productivity 
(quadrant) 
Perceived 
management 
responsiveness 
(quadrant) 
Changes in 
capabilities ( 
Figure 14) 
 
Increase tolerance  to 
dissent  ( curve 1) 
+20% 
(0.3) 
IV IV 
Decrease tolerance to 
dissent ( curve 2) 
-20% 
(0.2) 
IV IV 
Increase productivity of 
UD (curve 3) 
+20% 
(0.06) 
III III 
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Increase processing of 
dissent (curve4) 
+ 20% 
(0.6) 
IV IV 
Increase dissent per 
dissenter (curve 5) 
+20% 
(0.12) 
IV IV 
Reduce dissent per 
dissenter ( curve 6) 
-20% 
(0.08) 
IV IV 
 
III.	  Changes	  in	  multiple	  organizational	  capabilities	  
The policies here aim at changing a combination of organizational capabilities to improve 
performance and land in quadrant I (high organizational productivity and perceived 
management responsiveness).  The simulation results are shown in Figure 15 and in 
Table 4. In general they all improve both indicators to different degrees.  
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Figure 15: Simulation results for changes in multiple organizational capabilities showing 
the phase plot of each policy and the corresponding time series for the composition 
influence indicators on the side  
Curve 1 illustrates the increase of upward dissenters productivity and the processing of 
dissent which indicates that the institution is working on both fronts of skill building and 
maintenance plus the capability to process dissent. This would lead to less accumulated 
upward dissent that helps maintain a productive upward dissenters. A second policy 
(curve 2) adds to the first one by increasing the tolerance to dissent which shows a slight 
improvement in responsiveness due to the decline of dismissed dissent (Loop B7 and 8) 
and slight reduction in productivity as more effort is put into processing of dissent 
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relative to the production of outcomes.  A variation to the second policy is to decrease 
dissent tolerance; this might occur at an institution serious about dissent quality . This 
could be accomplished through  collegial prioritization of issues leading to a focus on 
critical matters which enables proactive processing  of upward dissent.  This may result 
in a slight decline in perceived management tolerance but higher gains in perceived 
management  responsiveness and in organizational productivity. The forth policy adds to 
the second policy the element of increasing dissent volume (dissent per dissenter) which 
could take place when the organization encourages its members to speak up about any 
issue in their mind and make it easy to do so. Curve 4 shows an improvement in both 
indicators with a slight decline in productivity early on which could deter the 
organization from following through on this policy.  The fifth policy (curve 5) combines 
the third policy with reduced dissent volume, which might take place when the 
organization has high dissent quality expectations and could decrease the volume of 
dissent in the presence of high productivity and high dissent processing.  It results in even 
better performance than the 4th policy as the accumulation of dissent is reduced which 
creates a favorable condition for the improvement of perceived management 
responsiveness leading to higher upward dissenters influence and higher organizational 
productivity.  
The outcomes from the above policies show that not a single but a host of dissent 
management policies can lead to improvements in the preferable performance quadrant ( 
I) which may suit one organization but not another.  In addition, across all these 
scenarios, at the beginning of the implementation, productivity does not instantaneously 
#ISDC14 53/58 Zaini et al  
 
improve and sometime even slightly declines (policy 3, curve 3); however, over the long 
term, it pays dividends. This makes it more challenging to maintain focus on 
implementing such policies especially when the focus is on short-term results or when the 
institution goes through a leadership change.  
Table 4: Summary of  policies for changing in multiple organizational capabilities 
Simulation 
(figure) 
Policy instrument 
(curve) 
Change 
(value) 
Organizational 
productivity 
(quadrant) 
Perceived management 
responsiveness 
(quadrant) 
Combined 
policies 
(Figure 15) 
Increase UD productivity + 
dissent processing (curve 1)  
+20%  
(0.06,0.6) 
I I 
1 +  increase dissent tolerance 
(curve 2) 
+20% (0.3)  I I 
 1+ decrease dissent tolerance 
(curve 3) 
+20% (0.2) I I 
2+ decrease  dissent per 
dissenter (curve 4) 
-20% 
(0.08) 
I I 
3 + decrease  dissent per 
dissenter (curve 5) 
-20% 
(0.08) 
I I 
Conclusion 
We successfully explored the utility of combining the dynastic cycle generic structure 
and the dissent expression framework to understand the effect of management handling 
of dissent and the organizational composition on communication climate and 
performance.  We built a generic model that  represents the organizational composition 
using the dynastic cycle resource allocation structure proposed by Saeed and Pavlov 
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(2008) in firms and the dissent expression and handling framework suggested by 
(Kassing, 2011). We tied their interactions by factors representing the organizational 
communication climate and performance. We introduced  two performance indices, 
namely, the perceived management responsiveness to dissent and the organizational 
productivity.  They are presented in a state space representation with quadrants that 
reflect different organizational performance states. We then argued then that the changes 
taking place in the American higher education institutions make our generic dissent 
model applicable to a university context.  
We have simulated the model with different policy sets. The first set relates to the growth 
of each organizational group under the same dissent tolerance and processing conditions. 
They all exhibited different degrees of initial improvements in organizational 
productivity only and the same long term steady state performance at low perceived 
management responsiveness and organizational productivity (quadrant IV) and 
dominated by administrative influence . Then we changed single model parameters that 
corresponded to different organizational capabilities. They showed a mix of performance 
profiles in quadrant IV with a leaning towards a greater prevalence of administrative 
influence. Finally, we changed  a combination of capabilities resulting in a policy suite 
that brings performance to quadrant I (high perceived management responsiveness and 
organizational productivity)  with a prevalent  voice climate.  
The simulations with successful outcomes suggest that performance improves when the 
university invests in improving its dissent processing capability and at the same time 
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enhances its faculty  productivity. When combined with higher standards for accepting 
dissent and a lower volume of dissent by focusing collegially on critical issues, 
performance is further improved.  However, the simulation showed that these 
investments take time and effort and fast returns are not to be expected. Failure to 
recognize these lags might results in abandoning such polices just before their favorable 
outcomes are realized.  With the short term focus on performance improvement in 
universities driven by external measures like national and international ranking and 
accreditation, implementing such polices could be very challenging.    
The generic model contribution to the dissent literature in the organization 
communication field comes from showing the impact of dissent accumulation and 
depletion in different forms on the organizational communication climate and 
productivity that change continuously  at different rates over the organization’s life time. 
It also shows that a certain set of polices will not generate the espoused outcome 
instantaneously and, contrary to expectations, may even result in unintended 
consequences.  We have also demonstrated the three states: overloaded - QII, 
underrepresented - QIII and IV, and optimum-  QI suggested by Kassing (Kassing, 2011) 
in addition to the possibility to move from one state to another. However, we have also 
shown that a host of polices to manage dissent, not a single one, could result in a space of 
favorable communication climate and performance. The path between the different states 
could pass through favorable and not so favorable states. This dynamic phenomena is 
best studied using the capability of system dynamics methodology. The insights from this 
work have a practical side to research and development and higher education 
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management professionals. They provide a platform for experimentation with different 
policy tools available to the administrators in these institutions.  
The model of theoretical findings could be further supported by exploring empirical cases 
for higher education institutions and how they evolved over time from the dissent 
perspective. Additionally, if applying this framework at the organizational level is 
successful, it has the potential to open inquiry into a third type of dissent manifestation, 
displaced dissent, and its impact on organizational performance. Displaced dissent may 
serve to endogenize the growth and decline of both the faculty and administrators  
through recruitment and attrition.  
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